

The Values of Staff in International Organizations

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In much of the academic literature, international organizations (IOs) appear as monolithic actors, rather than complex organizations (e.g. Ness and Brechin 1988). Reviews of the IO literature (for instance, Martin and Simmons 1998, Simmons and Martin 2002) barely touch on the issue of how IOs function internally. One even states that the literature addressing this question is ‘increasingly removed from the central problems of world politics’ (Simmons and Martin 2002: 193). Admittedly, some authors have studied particular types of IO employees in order to answer specific questions. They have focused on negotiators (Jacobson et al. 1983), top-bureaucrats in the European Commission (e.g. Hooghe 2001), relief and humanitarian workers (Atlani-Duault and Vidal 2009), and high-level or elected officials at the head of IOs (e.g. Volgy and Quistgard 1974). To comprehensively assess the values and motivations of IO staff, the focus of these studies must be broadened. As the literature increasingly considers IOs as agents of various principals, understanding what motivates staff is of considerable importance. This chapter examines whether IO staff hold a particular set of values, and if these values affect principal-agent relationships involving IO staff. Moreover, in dialogue with IO scholarship (e.g. Hooghe 2001, Checkel 2003), we investigate whether these values exist prior to IO staff recruitment, and are therefore dependent on some form of selection, or are the result of socialization.

Although IO employees have not often been linked to values in international relations (IR) research, organizations in general are thought to have values or guiding principles (Deal and Kennedy 1982). It has long been observed that IOs do not depart from this constant (Ness and Brechin 1988). As different IR traditions have acknowledged, IOs were established for the projection and institutionalization of values or international normative principles to frame the international system of states. From a functionalist perspective, the growth of IOs serves altruistic ends, creating an enmeshed and homogeneous international community (Ness and Brechin 1988: 247). However, even if built upon the broad principles stated in the United Nations (UN) Charter, relative heterogeneity in terms of values and purposes characterizes the environment in which IOs operate. Not all IOs are alike, and heterogeneity can be found both within and among these organizations (Coicaud 2001). These arguments suggest a *first question*: do all IO employees hold the same values and motivational patterns, despite working for different organizations? To answer this, the empirical analysis compares employees in humanitarian and technical IOs. We also consider the motivations of volunteers working within these organizations.

Value systems are fundamental and enduring beliefs, and can be described as grammars of actions (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991) that legitimate or justify behavior. It is therefore useful for both academics and practitioners to understand what sustains employees' commitment and involvement. While values and motivations are clearly linked to individuals' attitudes towards

their job or organization, they may also influence professional identities or work outcomes (Vaughan 1997). More precisely, theories of motivation presuppose that employees or volunteers are driven by the fulfillment of higher-order needs, such as values (e.g., Schwartz 2006). These values are linked to an individual's cultural background: 'National culture does make a difference in determining how we think and how we behave' (Steers and Sanchez-Runde 2002: 190). While research on for-profit companies has been interested in cross-cultural issues (Hofstede 1980), academic scholars have neglected the multinational non-profit sector (Merlot et al. 2006). These arguments suggest a *second question*: do IO employees hold the same values and motivational patterns despite their different cultural backgrounds? To address this question the empirical analysis systematically assesses whether employees from different cultural backgrounds have distinct values and motivational patterns.

Answering these questions raises the issue of whether the values among IO staff come from organizational socialization, self-selection and recruitment, or cultural background. We offer some preliminary evidence suggesting that a cosmopolitan elite populates IOs through self-selection and recruitment.

The literature review which follows covers: 1) the general literature on IOs, 2) what is known about international civil servants, and 3) what can be learned from studies carried out in national bureaucracies and the voluntary sector. The empirical section of the chapter is based on our own original dataset.

Studies on International Organizations

A brief look at survey articles and textbooks on IOs (e.g. Martin and Simmons 1998, Jacobson 2000, Simmons and Martin 2002, Rittberger et al. 2012, Hurd 2011) suggests that values, particularly those of IO employees, rarely occupy centre stage. This is unsurprising given that IOs have mainly been studied by IR scholars. In the broad paradigms dominating IR for considerable time (for instance, Carlsnaes et al. 2002, Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008), the internal life of IOs appears to be of little relevance. From a realist perspective, IOs are considered epiphenomenal, simply doing what major powers would have done in their absence. Similarly, liberal perspectives drawing on game-theory to explain cooperation (most notably Axelrod and Keohane 1985) consider IOs largely as slaves to member states' interests.

A pointed critique, mostly of this latter approach, appeared in the 1980s by scholars drawing on a public choice perspective (Frey 1997, Vaubel 1986, Vaubel and Willet 1991). This approach emphasizes that understanding international institutions² requires focusing on the motivations of those who created them, i.e. heads of state and government, and those operating within these institutions: the bureaucrats in IOs. This public choice or 'political economy' view of IOs was developed by economists (Vaubel 1986, Frey 1997). It is therefore hardly surprising that these scholars focused mainly on self-interest and viewed bureaucrats in the manner proposed by Niskanen (1971). Although public choice theorizing opened up discussion relating to IO staff, this discussion was restricted by the assumptions used to explain employee motivations. A related approach, known as the principal-agent framework (Bendor et al. 2001) also drew on work in economics yet went one step further. In this perspective, as applied to IOs (e.g. Fratianni and Pattison 1982, Kindleberger 1986, Pollack 1997, Nielsen and

Tierney 2003, Hawkins et al. 2006), governments create institutions and delegate particular tasks to the organizations that operate within these institutions. These IOs and their employees are thus agents to their principals (member-state governments), with the latter also involved in staff appointments. The principal-agent framework emphasizes that the interests of agents may diverge from those of their principals. This focused many scholars' minds on what determines the agents' interests.

Sociological approaches to international institutions and organizations (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 1999) place greater emphasis on the norms and values linked to the international realm. In this tradition, IOs have set forth their bureaucratic culture or character as an institution. This institution shapes the values of staff members and defines the power and legitimacy of the IO in the international realm. IOs act impersonally in the name of the values they claim to embody: 'It is the values and the people they serve that make bureaucracies, including IOs, respected and authoritative' (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 22). Even though notions like socialization (Checkel 2003) figure prominently in this approach, very few studies have explicitly dealt with individuals in general, and IO employees in particular (see Checkel and Moravcsik 2001). Functionalism, as applied mostly to European integration (Haas 1958, Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), has led to some consideration of the contributions of supranational actors. Spill over effects are one example.

International Organizations and Their Employees: Cosmopolitanism

Values and motivations have been studied in detail in work on national bureaucracies and voluntary organizations. However, analyses focusing on the motivations and values of IO employees have been rare. Some of the earliest studies in this area dealt with those working for the Commission of (now) the European Union (EU). By adopting an anthropological approach (Abélès and Bellier 1996) to understand 'organizational culture', or a neofunctional perspective (Hooghe 2001), scholars wished to understand the orientations and values prevalent in this particular international public administration. Hooghe finds that Commission officials do not completely lose their national political orientation, even after an extended period of time working for the EU. She thus questions whether organizational socialization is of much importance. When public administration scholars report that although 'the organizational mission differs somewhat from that of a national government, staff are inspired by the European ideal or deeply committed to creating policy in a specific field' (Vandenabeele and Ban 2009: 20).

Questions of staff characteristics in the UN system have been scrutinized along two main lines of inquiry. The first relates to the recruitment of staff members, the second to workforce management in an international environment. With regard to the former, scholars have addressed strategies for national representation in the directorates of IOs (Cogan 2009) and in all other strategic positions within them (Johns 2007). Multinational staffing with regard to conflicting loyalties, recruitment restrictions based on representation concerns (Michelmann 1978), and the specific managerial issues of intercultural communication and the building of a

common organizational culture (Annan 1988) have been longstanding issues in IO research. Scholars proposed that IO employees, because of their high level of education, especially at top levels, can be categorized as cosmopolitans, or ‘people with a worldview, a world-wide perspective, an orientation to the global as opposed to the national’ (McLaren 1997: 61). Thus, international civil servants can be portrayed as transnational cosmopolitan elites who first and foremost are loyal to the principles of the UN and not to their native cultures (McLaren 1997).

The idea of transnational allegiance is closely related to issues concerning value conflicts and the development of particular work cultures. For instance, dysfunctional behaviors (corruption, overspending, nepotism or fraud) in times of managerial failure or internal crisis have been associated with questions surrounding the integrity and loyalty of IO staff members (Harrell-Bond 2002, Beigbeder 2004, Salomons 2004). Moreover, the interconnections and recognized tensions between individual values and work motives (i.e., dedication to the needs of others while expecting power, social status or esteem in return, see Vaux 2001, De Jong 2011) have been identified as dominant identity traits of humanitarian workers (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 12). Moreover, social psychologists have described the building of a professional culture or identity in the humanitarian field and the crystallization of international epistemic communities sustaining the diffusion of norms, knowledge and practices (Fresia 2009). Thus, the rather eclectic research on IO staff to date has identified certain characteristics, linked to an international or cosmopolitan ideal, as common to IO staff.

Motivations and Values in the Public and Voluntary Domains

Several studies point to motivational differences between private and public sector employees, with the latter being more intrinsically motivated and less dependent on monetary incentives (Jurkiewicz et al. 1998). Public management scholars have also acknowledged that motivation at work is not only a matter of self-interest. They assert that furthering the public interest or well-being of others is an important driving motive. This commitment to public service values was conceptualized around the construct of Public Service Motivation (PSM) (Perry and Wise 1990), or ‘the beliefs, values and attitudes that go beyond self-interest and organizational interest, that concern the interests of a larger political entity and that motivate individuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate’ (Vandenabeele 2007: 20). The type of motivation implied by PSM is conceptually close to altruism and to the concept of pro-social motivation (Grant and Berg 2011: 29). PSM is also particularly preeminent among volunteers (Perry et al. 2008) and non-profit workers (Mann 2006, Steen 2008, Taylor 2010).

Empirical research on this subject has clearly shown that public-service-motivated employees are better motivated (Anderfuhren-Biget et al. 2010), more committed (Crewson 1997), more satisfied (Moynihan and Pandey 2007), and perform better (Brewer 2010). Drawing upon a principal-agent framework, Gailmard (2010) proposes that PSM is valuable for organizations as it means they can staff themselves with dedicated employees. Public-service-motivated employees may also bring, however, their own standards and values into the organizational setting, which may not be completely aligned with those of the organization.

While the recruitment of motivated employees is clearly important for any organization, it is particularly important for the non-profit sector to recruit pro-socially motivated

individuals. This is because volunteers are not remunerated, or are paid only insubstantially for their work. Norms and values are a key factor explaining the motivations of voluntary workers as they are considered to be a link between motives and pro-social action (see Musick and Wilson 2008 for an overview).

The norms linked to pro-social behavior are those involving social responsibility (Batson 1998), and are closely linked to certain types of personal values such as benevolence and universalism (e.g. Clary et al. 1998, Bardi and Schwartz 2003). These values may be culturally contingent to some extent (Welzel et al. 2005) but are nevertheless thought to guide social behavior. Values shape attitudes, norms and interests, and are distinct from these three concepts (Rokeach 1973). Values can be considered as antecedents of attitudes, which in turn influence behavior through intentions (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) or affective responses (Fazio et al. 1989). An example of the latter is the functional attitude explanation of the pro-social behavior model that has been used to explain volunteering (Clary et al. 1992).

Clary et al. (1998) developed a widely used Volunteer Function Inventory (VFI), which measures the functions behind volunteers' attitudes towards their work. Several authors have established the effect of volunteer motives on specific work outcomes and volunteer recruitment (e.g. Greenslade and White 2005, Finkelstein 2008). Thus, similar to PSM, volunteer functions play an important role in work outcomes. Moreover, the two constructs are closely conceptually related (Coursey et al. 2008).

The benefit of recruiting individuals who identify with organizational values or missions has been confirmed in a number of studies concerning volunteers (e.g. Puffer and Meindl 1992, Hitlin 2003) and paid employees (e.g. Finegan 2000, Kristof-Brown et al. 2005). However, these kinds of selection effects are not the only aspect of interest in the relationship between volunteers and organizations. Considerable socialization effects may also arise from organizational membership. First, extended volunteering may lead to the formation of a volunteer role identity (Penner 2002) which, in turn, aids organizational attachment and commitment (Oesterle et al. 2004). Second, there is ample evidence of the socialization effect of volunteering in terms of organizational values (e.g. Penner 2002). Thus for IOs, we expect individuals with strong humanitarian motivations to be drawn to organizations with a humanitarian mission. Furthermore, if the socialization hypothesis is correct, identification with the values of the UN system or perceived organizational values should be stronger with longer serving employees.

Values of Paid and Unpaid Employees in International Organizations

While the studies discussed above offer partial glimpses of the values and motivations of particular IO employees, a more comprehensive view is still missing. An original dataset collected in the context of a research project entitled "Motivating Employees and Volunteers of International Organizations: Do Values Matter?," allows for a broader view. This dataset covers several IOs and staff categories, and focuses on various dimensions of values and motivations. After having contacted several IOs, a web-based survey was made available to all staff members from those organizations willing to participate.³ Table 1 recapitulates the socio-demographic characteristics of the surveyed population.

Table 1: Description of the Sample

Sex*	Type of IO
<i>Men: 497 (46.8%)</i>	<i>Humanitarian: 1459 (83.1%)</i>
<i>Women: 564 (53.2%)</i>	<i>Technical: 296 (16.9%)</i>
Age Categories**	Origin***
<i>19-29: 78 (8.6%)</i>	<i>Africa: 167 (17.4%)</i>
<i>30-39: 295 (32.4%)</i>	<i>Asia-Pacific: 210 (21.9%)</i>
<i>40-49: 309 (33.9%)</i>	<i>Eastern Europe: 93 (9.7%)</i>
<i>50-59: 215 (23.6%)</i>	<i>Latin America and Caribbean: 65 (6.8%)</i>
<i>60-62: 12 (1.3%)</i>	<i>Western Europe and Others: 424 (44.2%)</i>
<i>63-65: 2 (0.2%)</i>	
Average Organizational Tenure	Employment Categories
<i>9.5 years</i>	<i>Paid employees: 1728 (97.7%)</i>
	<i>Interns/volunteers: 41 (2.3%)</i>

N=1769, * 60%, resp. ** 51.5%, *** 54.2% answered the question

We will now focus on four central aspects related to the values and motivations of IO employees. First, drawing on recent empirical studies of values, we rely on Schwartz's (1996) conception of human values. Second, as our interviewees work in the international public sector, we measure and assess levels of public service motivation. Third, as compared to employees in domestic administrations, our interviewees might well be attracted by the values of the UN system. We study this question by relying on a specific measure of UN values. Finally, since IOs depend on a considerable volunteer workforce (either interns or UN volunteers), we compare regular employees to voluntary workers. For each of these measures we assess whether the type of IO (humanitarian or technical) and the origins of employees and volunteers make a difference. We further assess whether we find evidence of differences which are attributable to organizational socialization versus recruitment and self-selection.

For human values, we rely on 21 items covering ten sub-dimensions and assume, following one of Schwarz and Bilsky's (1987) models, that these sub-dimensions form four main dimensions. The dimensions openness to change and conservation assess independence and readiness for new experiences against self-restriction and resistance to change. The self-enhancement and self-transcendence dimensions describe values that express self-interest respectively concern for others (Schwartz 2006). For simplicity's sake, we construct these dimensions by calculating the mean response values based on the sub-dimensions of each main dimension. Table 2 shows the mean values on the four value dimensions (simple averages of the additive scales), where higher values indicate 'likeness' and lower values 'unlikeness' to persons pursuing these goals. The table shows that IO employees from different organizations tend to be quite similar with regard to the four value dimensions. The only slight exception is

the self-enhancement dimension, where employees of technical IOs score lower than those of humanitarian IOs.

Table 2: Values in Four International Organizations

	Openness to Change	Conservation	Self- Enhancement	Self- Transcendence
<i>Humanitarian</i>	2.64 (0.05)	2.59 (0.06)	2.27 (0.05)	3.50 (0.06)
<i>Technical</i>	2.68 (0.12)	2.72 (0.17)	2.03 (0.11)	3.62 (0.18)
<i>N</i>	261	174	280	227
<i>F</i>	0.10	0.46	2.80	0.35
<i>p(F)</i>	0.75	0.50	0.05	0.86

For Tables 2-6: Standard errors in parentheses F = F-statistic; p(F) = value of significance test

Similarly, the average values per UN regional group (not shown) provide little indication of systematic differences across countries of citizenship. Some evidence to the contrary appears for the conservation dimension, where employees from Africa and Asia score higher than those of other regional groups. We find no difference on any of the four value dimensions according to paid or unpaid status. This may be partly due to the fact that most of the volunteers surveyed work in humanitarian organizations. Most of the paid staff interviewed also work in this type of IO.

Turning to the empirical assessment of the public service motivation of IO employees, a precision should be made. Since its conceptualization, PSM has been considered an aggregate construct (Kim 2011) comprising four dimensional facets or public service orientations. Employees can fulfill their need to contribute to the greater good of humanity by engaging in the policy-making process (attraction to politics and policy making), by dedicating themselves towards the realization of the common good (commitment to the public interest), by developing compassionate feelings with particular targeted-groups (compassion), and by risking personal loss to pursue a goal considered as essential (self-sacrifice) (Perry 1996). Table 3 reports the average level of these four PSM dimensions for both categories of IOs. It shows that IO employees value the four facets of PSM differently. The figures provide evidence that IO employees working in the humanitarian domain are more likely to be disinterestedly motivated than those working in technical IOs.

Table 3: Four PSM Dimensions in International Organizations

	Attraction to Politics and Policy Making	Commitment to the Public Interest	Compassion	Self-Sacrifice
<i>Humanitarian</i>	4.21 (0.02)	3.98 (0.02)	3.87 (0.02)	3.72 (0.03)
<i>Technical</i>	3.82 (0.07)	3.66 (0.06)	3.58 (0.06)	3.30 (0.06)
<i>N</i>	<i>1217</i>	<i>1191</i>	<i>1208</i>	<i>1203</i>
<i>F</i>	40.41	22.76	21.19	31.24
<i>p(F)</i>	.000	.000	.000	.000

With regard to differences across regional groups (not shown), we find that these are slightly statistically significant for two of the four dimensions of PSM. Asians, and to a lesser extent, Africans, are more likely to have higher compassion PSM than IO employees coming from other parts of the world. Regarding the self-sacrifice dimension, Eastern Europeans, and to a lesser extent Asians, are more driven by selflessness. The distinction between paid and unpaid employees is not relevant for all but one dimension of PSM: unpaid employees score significantly higher on the political dimension of PSM. Moreover, as a point of comparison, one must stress that the mean levels for each of the PSM dimensions are higher for the studied population than for the national employees surveyed in most PSM studies (for a state of the art in PSM research: Perry and Hondeghem 2008, for a comparison with Swiss public agents: Anderfuhren-Biget 2012). Accordingly, the PSM levels and dimensional configurations of international civil servants show greater similarity to the staff of non-governmental organizations (Taylor 2010) or to European Commission officials (Vandenabeele and Ban 2009) than to national bureaucrats.

As stated earlier, one of the major issues when studying the values of IO employees is whether or not a common referential in terms of values constitutes their identity. To assess this, we constructed a variable reflecting adherence to the values of the UN system, with seven items reflecting the primary UN goals: maintaining peace and international security, working towards achieving international cooperation, improving social justice, promoting human dignity, promoting human rights, promoting freedom of speech and promoting freedom of religious beliefs. Not surprisingly, we find that these values are more strongly present in humanitarian IOs (4.46, standard error 0.01) than in technical IOs (4.24, standard error 0.05), a statistically significant difference. Conversely, the valuation of these common system principles is not influenced significantly by different origins in terms of regional groups.⁴

Finally, we compare work functions for the different categories of IO employees. According to studies of voluntary workers, unpaid staff appears to be most strongly motivated by values (concern for others), learning (wanting to acquire new skills) and enhancement (improving personal or social aspects of one's life). The differences between the different types of organization are, however, significant for all work functions (see Table 4).⁵ Employees of

humanitarian organizations have, on average, higher levels of work motivations.

Table 4: Work Functions and Type of International Organization

	Values	Career	Protection	Social	Learning	Enhancement
<i>Humanitarian</i>	4.50 (0.02)	3.05 (0.03)	2.30 (0.03)	3.00 (0.33)	3.98 (0.02)	3.30 (0.03)
<i>Technical</i>	3.76 (0.07)	2.65 (0.07)	1.88 (0.05)	2.47 (0.07)	3.44 (0.06)	2.90 (0.07)
<i>N</i>	<i>1311</i>	<i>1249</i>	<i>1240</i>	<i>1198</i>	<i>1304</i>	<i>1276</i>
<i>F</i>	215.57	23.05	31.21	41.27	78.51	30.20
<i>(p)F</i>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

When comparing different regions of origin (not shown), there are some differences regarding protection and enhancement functions. Employees from Eastern Europe are less likely to choose IO work because they wish to improve on or distract from negative aspects of their life. These differences remain statistically significant when controlling for other organizational variables and socio-demographic factors.

As we are using an (adapted) instrument developed specifically for volunteer work, we also check for differences between types of employee. We find significant differences between interns/volunteers and regular employees in terms of career and learning functions (see Table 5).

Table 5: Work Functions and Type of Employee

	Values	Career	Protection	Social	Learning	Enhancement
<i>Regular Employees</i>	4.38 (0.01)	2.98 (0.03)	2.23 (0.03)	2.91 (0.03)	3.90 (0.02)	3.23 (0.03)
<i>Interns/Volunteers</i>	4.44 (0.10)	3.85 (0.14)	2.07 (0.18)	2.78 (0.23)	4.23 (0.10)	3.48 (0.18)
<i>N</i>	<i>1321</i>	<i>1248</i>	<i>1250</i>	<i>1206</i>	<i>1312</i>	<i>1285</i>
<i>F</i>	0.16	19.32	0.72	0.45	4.79	1.75
<i>(p)F</i>	0.70	0.00	0.39	0.50	0.03	0.19

We may assume that these differences are due to age, as UN volunteers and interns are younger than average employees. When controlling for age, organizational tenure and other

organizational variables, however, the effect of the type of employee loses statistical significance altogether. Organizational tenure (not age), however, does have significant effects on the type of work function, with values, career, learning and enhancement functions diminishing with increasing tenure. This latter finding indicates a weakening of work motivation over time. IO employees are, by and large, more strongly motivated at the beginning of their assignments, which points toward a confirmation of the selection hypothesis. It does not necessarily, however, provide direct support for the socialization hypothesis, as work functions do not need to be related to organizational socialization.

This finding suggests that we need to look more closely at the effect of organizational tenure on human values, PSM, and UN system values. Similar to work motivation, we do not expect human values to change with organizational tenure. PSM, and to a greater extent UN system values may, however, be affected by tenure.

When comparing the human values of IO employees and volunteers with their compatriots, Häfliger and Hug (2012) show that these two groups differ considerably, even when controlling for socio-demographic factors. This suggests that two processes may be operating. First, it may be that careers in IOs attract individuals with a certain set of values, which cannot be explained by socio-demographic characteristics. Second, employees and volunteers working in IOs might, after having been recruited, have been socialized in their new working environment. For this second explanation to be true, we would need to find some evidence that the values of IO employees and volunteers systematically differ as a function of tenure in the IO and/or age. We find, however, no systematic and statistically significant effect for either of these variables on the four dimensions. This seems to suggest that individuals working in IOs have, already at the time of their recruitment, a different set of values from their compatriots. If these values are, at least in part, at the core of some of the actions undertaken by IO employees, the principal-agent problem discussed above may be considerable.

Turning to PSM, we find that its general level decreases with tenure. In addition, once we control for this latter variable, the effect of the type of organization and UN region both lose statistical significance. The only exception is the compassion motivation, as employees of humanitarian organizations continue to have slightly increased levels of compassion. As for the work functions discussed above, we find no evidence for socialization effects but possible effects due to resignation and cynicism developing over time (Andersson 1996, Giauque et al. 2012).

Finally, tenure also appears not to influence adherence to UN system values (indicative of the existence of a cosmopolitan elite), again questioning socialization effects. As we also find that once we control for tenure the effect reported for the type of IO on UN system values loses statistical significance, we suspect that attraction and selection effects may dominate and thus lead to a certain homogeneity in terms of shared values. This is in line with the 'cosmopolitan' hypothesis.

Conclusion

The literature on IOs has largely neglected the study of employee values and motivations.

While some work, particularly in the European integration context, has supported the socialization hypothesis (e.g. Checkel 2003), empirical evidence has started to point the other way (e.g. Hooghe 2001). Work concerned with top-level IO staff has suggested the existence of a particular type of cosmopolitan elite, with a specific set of values and motivations (McLaren 1997). Our empirical analysis tends to confirm this hypothesis. We find little indication of value socialization in IO staff. Conversely, there is clear evidence of the selection hypothesis. Individuals with a particular set of values and motivations are drawn to work in IOs. Furthermore, we find small regional differences in work motivation (work functions) but not in terms of values. This, again, does not support the (cultural) socialization hypothesis, but rather shows a certain homogeneity concerning selection processes which attract applicants with similar configurations of values.

While these results are of interest as such, further research has to assess whether these value differences matter. As we have discussed in this chapter, IO employees and volunteers are clearly not a simple representative sample drawn from the citizens of their home country. IO staff work for the citizens of IO member countries, either directly and/or indirectly. We might therefore be worried about possible agency losses, if staff were to make decisions not in their ultimate principal's interest. In the absence of studies linking the values of IO staff to their decisions, we can neither disconfirm such agency losses, nor assume that these values do not matter. Starting from our study of values in IOs, future research should assess these possibilities and thus lead to a fuller understanding of IOs.

Recommended for Further Reading: Hooghe, L. (2001), Perry and Hondeghem (2008), Reinalda and Verbeek (2004), and Musick and Wilson (2008).

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2 Here we draw on North's (1990: 3-7) distinction between institutions (rules) and organizations (created to operate in these institutions).

3 IOs insisted on proceeding in this way. Thus, depending on the IO's capacity to involve their employees in the research, as well as their decentralized character, response rates ranged from 14 to 44 per cent.

4 If age and gender differences have no effect on the valuation of UN system values, unpaid employees (interns and UN volunteers) score significantly higher. Accordingly, the more motivated employees (unpaid, in this case) are also those who identify themselves more with the constituting values of the UN system.

5 The career function encapsulates career improvement motivation, the social function relates to the social desirability of work and the protection function to distracting from negative aspects of life (Clary et al. 1998).